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NOTES

Presumptive Mens Rea: An Analysis of the Federal
Judiciary's Retreat from Sandstrom v. Montana
Direct or empirical evidence rarely provides proof of mens rea, a critical element of most crimes. 1 The practical difficulties inherent in proving that a criminal defendant had the requisite state of mind have led to
presumptions 2 of mens rea. Thejudiciary's attempt to provide a constitutional standard for the use of presumptions in criminal trials culminated
in Sandstrom v. Montana.3 In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court held that the
jury instruction, "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
4
consequences of his voluntary acts," violates due process.
Sandstrom and its progeny have provoked both controversy and chaos
in the legal community. This Note examines the goals embodied in Sandstrom and the extent to which these goals have been frustrated by the
federal judiciary's treatment of Sandstrom during the past decade. Part I
sketches the historical development and use of presumptions. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's pre-Sandstrom attempts to constitutionalize
1 The maxim actus notfacit reum nisi mens sit rea expresses the common law principle that "an act
does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty." Strict liability crimes are a notable exception to
this general rule. See generally I W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, SUBSTAN rVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (1986).
2 A presumption is a deductive device that allows or requires the factfinder to assume the existence of one fact upon proof of another fact. The term "presumption" is ambiguous; one author
posits that it is used in at least eight different senses by the judiciary. Laughlin, In Support of the
Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 196-207 (1953). The lay meaning of "presumption" is "to accept as true or credible without proof or before inquiry." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1796 (1986). This Note gives the term the following technical meanings:
1. A permissive presumption provides that the factfinder may, but is not required to, find the
existence of the presumed fact upon proof of the basic fact. Sometimes a condition precedent to the
presumption's application exists. For example, "Fact X may be presumed from Fact Y unless litigant

A produces evidence to controvert Fact X" is a permissive presumption with a condition precedent
to its application. Permissive presumptions are sometimes called "inferences."
2. A mandatory rebuttable presumption requires a finding of the presumed fact upon proof of the
basic fact, unless that finding is rebutted. As a practical matter, the duty of rebuttal generally falls to
the opponent of the presumption. Fulfillment of this duty may involve producing evidence which controverts the presumed fact (a "production shifting presumption") orpersuadingthe factfinder that the
presumption should not be applied (a "persuasion shifting presumption"). For example, "Fact X
must be presumed from Fact Y unless litigant A produces evidence to controvert Fact X" is a
mandatory rebuttable presumption; the duty to rebut entails the burden of producing evidence
showing the non-existence of Fact X, but not of persuading the factfinder to believe the evidence
produced.
3. A conclusive presumption requires the factfinder to find the presumed fact upon proof of the
basic fact, even in the face of rebuting evidence. "Fact X must always be presumed from Fact Y" is
an example of a conclusive presumption.

Unfortunately, the judiciary lacks an aptness for clarity in phrasing many presumptions. Interpretive difficulties as to the true nature of a given presumption often arise. For a thorough discussion of the use and classification of presumptions, see Graham, Presumptios-More Than You Ever
Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterestedto Ask, 17 GRIM. L. BULL. 431 (1981); Asford & Risinger,
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ. 165
(1969). This Note focuses primarily on conclusive and persuasion shifting presumptions.
3 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
4 Id. at 521-24; see infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
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the use of presumptions, while Part III analyzes the Sandstrom mandate.
Part IV reviews the challenges Sandstrom has faced in the federal courts
over the past decade. Part V considers how the frequent application of
the harmless error doctrine and the stringent requirements for habeas
corpus review have impeded Sandstrom's implementation. Part VI concludes that widespread confusion over and resistance to Sandstrom's mandate have rendered it ineffective and recommends that the judiciary
reconsider its treatment of Sandstrom.
I. The Historical Development and Use of Presumptions
The mens rea presumption dates to the Mosaic Code5 and became
firmly entrenched in the English common law. 6 Early rationales supporting presumptions included the perceived necessity for judicial guidance
of lay juries 7 and the impracticality of proving certain facts.8 Most pretwentieth century scholars believed that only a rebuttable deductive device deserves the title "presumption."-9 These scholars labeled conclusive presumptions as judicial legislation, since, in essence, conclusive
presumptions make one fact the legal equivalent of another.' 0 Conversely, they freed permissive presumptions of all legal significance, so as
5 See Numbers 35:16-22 (New International Version) (malice aforethought or hostility presumed
from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon). See generally I S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 113 n.1 (16th ed. 1899) (explaining the ancient origins of the mens rea presumption).
6 Thayer described the development of presumptions in the common law as follows:
Many facts and groups of facts often recur, and when a body of men with a continuous
tradition has carried on for some length of time this process of reasoning upon facts that
often repeat themselves, they cut short the process and lay down a rule. To such facts they
affix, by a general declaration, the character and operation which common experience has
assigned to them.
J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 326 (1898).
7 "Such advice and such direction is natural and desirable when a presiding learned tribunal is
instructing an unlearned one ...for the administration of the law should be kept consistent." Id. at
318.
8 "It will readily be seen that were no such presumption raised, crime would still more often go
unwhipped ofjustice, and the criminal could carry his 'I don't mean to' as a safe and certain talisman
to keep him immune from the consequences of his misdemeanor." 1 B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE,
§ 130, at 211 (2d. ed. 1926).
9 Thayer advanced this view:
Presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation, which assume the truth of certain
matters for the purpose of some given inquiry.... When the term is legitimately applied it
designates a rule or a proposition which still leaves open to further inquiry the matter assumed. The exact scope and operation of these primafacie assumptions are to cast upon the
party against whom they operate, the duty of going forward, in argument or evidence, on
the particular point to which they relate.
J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 314 (footnote omitted).
10 Thayer explained:
In such cases [where conclusive presumptions are used], that which is evidential merely...
has itself become the subject of a rule of substantive law, and comes to have certain consequences directly annexed to it .... [lit is clear that this is true legislation .... Such is the
nature of all rules to determine the legal effect of facts as contrasted with their logical effect.
To prescribe and fix a certain legal equivalence of facts, is a very different thing from merely
allowing that meaning to be given to them.
J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 316-17. Wigmore agreed, asserting that "in strictness there cannot be
such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption.' Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not exist ...the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for the
purpose of the proponent's case." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2492, at
307-08 (Chadbourn Rev. 1981).
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to afford the permissive presumption a legal weight no greater than its
natural probative force."
The presumption that "a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts," held unconstitutional in Sandstrom, has enjoyed
frequent use since the early days of the common law.' 2 It gained the
qualified approval of nineteenth century jurisprudes under a variety of
rationales. Thayer thought the principle to be a sound maxim of legal
reasoning; he quarrelled, however, with its expression as a "presumption" of law. l3 According to Greenleaf, the presumption belonged to a
class in which "long experienced connection ...has been found so general and uniform as to render it expedient for the common good that this
connection be taken to be inseparable and universal."' 4 Nonetheless,
Greenleaf conceded that case law limited the presumption's application
to trials in which no evidence of intent had been introduced and allowed
rebuttal evidence when the presumption was applied.' 5 Similarly, Law11 See, e.g. ,J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 334 ("Of course it must be remembered always that many
widely different things are called 'presumptions.' As regards all that class of things, thus named,
which are merely judicial recognition of what is probable, or permissible in reasoning, or of what is
sufficient to support a verdict, these have no quality of substantive law.") (footnote omitted); see also
1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 5, § 44 ("They are, in truth, but mere arguments" and "depend upon
their own natural force and efficacy in generating belief or conviction in the mind.").
Thayer believed that judges should exercise great caution to prevent overemphasizing the
weight of a permissive presumption. In discussing a case in which the judge did not exercise such
caution, Thayer noted:
[I]t is probable that grave consequences followed from this sort of error; far too serious an
emphasis was laid on a matter of mere ordinary probability, by laying it down to the jury as
a "legal presumption".... It seems likely, in this case, that this unexplained use of the term
"legal presumption" . . . contributed materially towards what was felt to be the difficult
result of a conviction. In that point of view the case may serve as a conspicuous warning
against loose modes of expression very common in our courts. To be sure, the men who
were hanged in this case well deserved their fate-had the law been adequate; but in the
next case, where feelings run high, they may not deserve it.
J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 340 n.l.

12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 17 (1868) ("He who uses upon the body of another, at some vital part, with a manifest intention to use it upon him, a deadly weapon, as an ax, a
gun, a knife, or a pistol, must, in the absence of qualifying facts be presumed to intend the death
which is the probable and ordinary consequences of such an act."); Commonwealth v. Webster, 60
Mass. (5 Gush.) 295, 316 (1850) ("The ordinary feelings, passions, and propensities under which
parties act, are facts known by observation and experience; and they are so uniform in their operation, that a conclusion may be safely drawn, that if a person acts in a particular manner he does so
under the influence of a particular motive."); accord Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 93
(1845); Murphy v. People, 37 Ill. 447 (1865); Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 636 (1856).
13 Thayer asserted:
Often these maxims and ground principles get expressed in this form of a presumption
perversely and inaccurately, as when... the doctrine that every one is chargeable with the
natural consequences of his conduct, is expressed in the form that every one is presumed to
intend these consequences.... In whatever form they are made or ought to be made, their
character is the same, that of general maxims in legal reasoning, having no particular relation to the law of evidence.
J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 335 (footnote omitted).
14 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 5, at 111.
15 Id. at 113 & n.1. Greenleaf comments that this qualification "limits the application of the rule
very much, for in a very few cases will the killing by the defendant be the only thing shown. The
circumstances in every case will tend to prove or disprove malice, which then becomes a question of
fact to be decided by the jury." Id. at 113 n.l. Modern courts have generally given the mens rea
presumption in jury instructions regardless of the presence or absence of evidence of mens rea. For
example, the trial court in Sandstrom instructed the jury on the presumption of intent even though
Sandstrom introduced evidence tending to show a lack of intent. 442 U.S. at 512.
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son recognized the widespread use of the presumption, but disapproved
of its reputation as an "infallible proposition." 16 He suggested that if the
evidence of intent in a particular case is weak, the presumption should
correspondingly be given little weight. 17 Furthermore, Lawson completely exempted offenses which required a "specific intent" from the
reach of the mens rea presumption. ' 8 Regardless of the approach taken to
the presumption of intent, however, scholars and courts have never
doubted its value to the prosecution. 19
II.

The Constitutionalization of Presumptions

The twentieth century introduced an era of heightened awareness of
the constitutional need for procedural due process. As the Supreme
Court placed the process of proof in criminal trials under closer scrutiny,
the use of mens rea presumptions became constitutionally suspect. Three
general developments in procedural due process influenced Sandstrom:
(1) precedent discussing the allocation and measure of proof in criminal
trials; 20 (2) precedent discussing the propriety of using presumptions as
aids to proof;22 12 and (3) precedent providing a method for classifying
presumptions.
A.

Allocation and Measure of the Burden of Persuasion

A trilogy of cases dealing with the allocation and measure of the burden of persuasion impacted the Sandstrom Court's analysis of persuasion
shifting presumptions. These cases raise a due process issue: which facts
must the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt? The first case in
this series, In re Winship,2 3 held that the prosecution must prove "every
fact necessary to constitute the crime." 24 However, interpretive difficulties followed Winship.
16

J. LAWSON, THE LAW OF PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE 270 (1886) (citingJones v. Howland, 49 Mass.

(8 Met.) 306 (1844) for the proposition stated).
17 Id. at 271 (" 'The act done and the circumstances attending its commission may indicate more
or less clearly the intention of the party doing it, and authorize an inference of more or less weight in
regard to such intention.' ") (quoting Quinebaug Bank v. Brewster, 30 Conn. 559, 563 (1862)).
18 Id. ("A statute makes a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing murder in the first degree.
B kills G. There is no presumption that the killing was deliberate and premeditated.. . . '[W]hen a
statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent ...must
be found by the jury, as a matter of fact, before a conviction can be had.' ") (quoting Roberts v.
People, 19 Mich. 401, 414 (1870)).
19 See generally Chamberlain, Presumptions as FirstAid to the DistrictAttorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928)
(arguing that statutory mens rea presumptions "help the district attorney out of [the] predicament"
posed by the presumption of innocence, privilege against self incrimination, and prosecutorial reasonable doubt standard); see also United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 83 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the presumption "is a boon to prosecutors and an incongruous snare for defendants in a country that claims to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
20 See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
23 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
24 Id. at 364. Il'inship held that the prosecutorial reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally
required by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The Court reasoned
that since the defendant in a criminal trial "has at stake an interest of transcending value," due
process demands that the "margin of error" be reduced by placing a reasonable doubt standard on
the prosecution. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
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In Mullaney v. Wilber,2 5 a state law required the defendant in a murder trial to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide charge to manslaughter. A
successful heat of passion defense operated to negate a presumption of
malice, which was the sole statutory factor distinguishing murder from
manslaughter.2 6 Employing a two step analysis, the Supreme Court held
that the requirement violated Winship.
The Court first examined the historical evolution of the law of homicide. It found the presence or absence of "heat of passion on sudden
provocation" to be "the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide." 2 7 Second, the
Court examined the distinction between murder and manslaughter; it
concluded that they "differ significantly" in terms of punishment and
stigma.2 8 Even though "heat of passion" was not an enumerated statutory element, the Court decided that its absence fell definitionally within
29
those facts necessary to constitute murder.
The sweeping language of Mullaney3 0 lost much of its force in Patterson v. New York.31 In Patterson, a state law required a defendant charged
with murder to prove that he acted under "extreme emotional disturbance" in order to reduce the charge to manslaughter. 32 The Supreme
25 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
26 Id. at 685-87. Under Maine law, three elements constituted murder: (1) unlawfulness [i.e., a
killing which is neither justifiable nor excusable]; (2) intent; and (3) malice aforethought. Three
elements also constituted manslaughter: (1) unlawfulness; (2) intent; and (3) heat of passion on
sudden provocation. The trial court instructed the jury that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied
unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation. The court also instructed the jury that malice aforethought and heat of
passion on sudden provocation are inconsistent; thus, by proving the latter, the defendant negates
the former and reduces the homicide to manslaughter. Id.
27 Id. at 696. The Court also found that the "clear trend" among the states was to make the
prosecution bear the burden of proof on this issue. Id.
28 Id. at 697. The penalty for murder under Maine law was life imprisonment, while the penalty
for manslaughter consisted of no more than a $1000 fine or 20 years imprisonment. Id. at 686 n.3.
The prosecution argued that since the fact in question did not enter into dispute until the jury had
already determined that the defendant was guilty of either murder or manslaughter, his interest in
liberty and reputation had diminished. Id. at 697. The Court flatly rejected this reasoning, explaining that "[tihe safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a
significant impairment of personal liberty." Id. at 698.
29 The Court explained that if it limited H'inship to only those facts as defined by state law, "a
State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any
substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements .... IVinship is
concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism." Id. at 698-99 (footnote omitted).
30 Some courts and commentators predicted the demise of affirmative defenses after Mullaney.
See, e.g., Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975) (lullaney prohibits placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant for any theory ofjustification, excuse, or mitigation); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 352 N.E.2d 203 (1976) (Mullaney requires the prosecution to
bear the burden of persuasion on self defense); Case Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant:
Mullaney v. Wilber and the ReasonableDoubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 390, 391 (1976) ("In
the recent case of Mullaney v. H'ilber, the Supreme Court has put forth an analysis which, if carried to
its logical conclusion, suggests that it may no longer be proper to impose upon the defendant in a
criminal trial the burden of proving any fact which will affect the determination of his guilt or the
degree thereof.") (footnotes omitted).
31 432 U.S. 197 (1976).
32 Under New York law, two elements, intent and causation, constituted second degree murder.
Manslaughter consisted of intent, causation, and extreme emotional disturbance. If the prosecution
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Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the "extreme emotional
disturbance" defense did not operate to negate any statutory element of
murder.3 3 The Court defended its narrow interpretation of Mullaney by
explaining that due process requires that "only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative
branch." '3 4 However, the Patterson dissent argued that the majority's
mechanical approach invites legislative circumvention of the principles
elucidated in Winship and Mullaney.3
B.

Presumptions as Aids to or Replacements for Evidence

A related but distinct issue arose in two other pivotal pre-Sandstrom
cases:
Morissette v. United States3 6 and United States v. United States Gypsum
Co. 3 7 Whereas Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson explored the issue of
which facts the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, Morissette and Gypsum addressed the propriety of using conclusive presumptions to meet this burden of persuasion.
In Morissette, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's holding that
felonious intent "is presumed by [the defendant's] own act." 38 The
Court characterized the presumption as conclusive, and then explained
that "[a] conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow
would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense." 3 9 The
Court asserted that even a permissive presumption of intent would
proved intent and causation, the defendant would be convicted of second degree murder unless he
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, Id. at 198-99 nn.2-3.
33 Id. at 206-07 ("This affirmative defense ... does not serve to negative any facts of the crime
which the state is to prove in order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue ....").
Although the Court claimed to remain true. to Winship and Mullaney, the difference between requiring the prosecution to prove "all of the elements necessary to constitute the crime" and requiring
the prosecution to prove "all of the elements included in the definition of the offense," id. at 210,
clearly involves more than semantics.
34 Id. The Court opined that since the defendant has better knowledge of and access to the
evidence, placing the burden of persuasion upon him, with a lower threshold of proof, is fair. Id. at
211 n.13. The Court made no attempt to justify its position in light of its repeated refusal to accept
this "comparative convenience" argument in past cases. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
45 (1969).
35 432 U.S. at 217-32 (Powell,J., dissenting). The dissent argued that since "extreme emotional
disturbance" is the modern equivalent of "heat of passion," draftsmanship, not substance, differentiated the Maine and New York statutes. Id. at 220. The dissent accused the majority of being "indefensibly formalistic," and of turning Winship and M.ullaney into a "simplistic lesson in statutory
draftsmanship." Id. at 224.
36 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
37 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
38 342 U.S. at 249. Morissette was charged with stealing and converting government property.
He admitted taking the property, but argued that he thought the government had abandoned it.
The trial court refused to allow this defense into evidence. Id.
39 Id. at 275. The Court explained that "[wihere intent... is an ingredient of the crime charged,
its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. . . . 'However clear the proof
may be, or however uncontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to
the jury.'" Id. at 274 (quoting People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (1891)).
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wrongly prejudge a conclusion for the jury, perhaps even one which the
40
evidence did not support.
Similarly, the Gypsum Court found error in a conclusive presumption
of intent. 4 1 The Court explained that the "jury must remain free to consider additional evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference." 4 2
Unlike Morissette, however, the Gypsum Court expressed approval of per43
missive presumptions.
C. Methods for Classification of Presumptions
Courts use the term "presumption" broadly to encompass a variety
of meanings. 44 Because the constitutional validity of a presumption may
depend upon its classification, 45 the need exists for a principled method
by which reviewing courts can determine the nature of challenged presumptions. The Supreme Court responded to this need in Ulster County
v. Allen 4 6 with the following formulation: A reviewing court must examine the words actually spoken to the factfinder to determine the most
accurate interpretation of the presumption. If the presumption is statutory in nature, the court may resort to the underlying statute as well as
other cases interpreting the presumption's meaning. 47 The Supreme
s
Court developed this standard further in Sandstrom.4
40 Id. at 275. The Court found that the trial court also erred in holding that the only question of
intent was whether the defendant intended to take the property. The Court explained that, although
the defendant admitted the conscious and intentional act of taking the property, "that isolated fact is
not an adequate basis on which the jury should find the criminal intent. . . wrongfully to deprive
another of possession of property." Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
41 438 U.S. at 446. The Gypsum defendants had allegedly engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act. The trial court instructed the jury that if the jury found that the
exchange of price information among the defendants affected prices, then intent existed as a matter
of law. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. ("[lt would be correct to instruct the jury that it may infer intent from an effect on
prices.").
44 See supra note 2.
45 For example, the Gypsum Court opined that if the presumption in that case had, merely allowed
the jury to infer the existence of intent from the effect that the defendants' agreement had on prices,
the presumption would be constitutional. 438 U.S. at 446. See also supra note 43 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, most cases prior to Sandstrom did not find the conclusive-rebuttable-permissive
distinction to be critical. See C. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 347, at 997 n.68 ("[Early
cases did not] appear to turn on the question whether the presumption involved was 'mandatory' or
'permissive.' ").
46 442 U.S. 140 (1979). Allen discusses the constitutional analysis appropriate for permissive
and production shifting presumptions. According to Allen, a reviewing court should examine permissive presumptions factually; if,
in light of all the evidence, the basic fact rationally connects with
the ultimate fact, then the presumption is valid. Conversely, production shifting presumptions
should be reviewed facially; thus, the reviewing court should not consider the sufficiency of the evidence. Allen relied on a series of cases beginning with Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), to
reach its conclusions. For a thorough discussion of Allen and the cases upon which it relies, see
Schmolesky, County Court of Ulster v. Allen and Sandstrom v. Montana- The Supreme Court Lends an
Ear but Turns Its Face, 33 RurGERs L. REV. 261 (1981).
47 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
48 See infra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text. However, the Sandstrom Court did not apply the
standards of review enunciated in Allen for production shifting and permissive presumptions. 442
U.S. at 519 n.9. The Sandstrom Court distinguished Allen on the ground that Sandstrom dealt with
persuasion shifting and conclusive presumptions. Id.
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The Sandstrom Mandate

A Montana jury convicted David Sandstrom of "deliberate homicide" in 1977. Under Montana law, deliberate homicide required that
the defendant "purposely or knowingly" caused the death of another
person. 49 Although Sandstrom confessed to the killing, he contended
that a personality disorder prevented him from "purposely or knowingly" taking his victim's life. 50 The trial court instructed the jury that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts." 5 ' Sandstrom argued that this presumption unconstithe "purposely
tutionally shifted to the defense the burden of disproving
52
or knowingly" element of deliberate homicide.
A.

Characterization

In accord with Allen, the unanimous Court first determined the nature of the presumption under attack. This determination, the Court explained, requires "careful attention" to the jury instructions, because
whether Sandstrom "has been accorded his constitutional rights depends
upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the
instruction." 53 Although the prosecution argued that the instruction described nothing more than a permissive or production shifting presumption, the Court rejected both characterizations because a "risk" existed
that Sandstrom's jurors had interpreted it otherwise. 54 In fact, the Court
concluded that Sandstrom's jurors may have interpreted the presumption as either conclusive or persuasion shifting. 5 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the lack of qualifying instructions which
49 442 U.S. at 512-13.
50 Id. at 512. Two court-appointed mental health experts testified at trial that Sandstrom was of
borderline retarded intelligence and suffered from a personality disorder marked by aggressiveness,
impulsiveness, and a lack of planning. They also testified that alcohol consumption would severely
heighten this disorder. Sandstrom consumed between three and four six packs of beer and some
whiskey on the night of the homicide. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Sandstrom (No. 78-5384).
51 442 U.S. at 513.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 514. To the extent that Sandstrom refused to give credence to the Montana Supreme
Court's interpretation of the instruction, see infra note 54, it arguably steps beyond the boundaries
set by Allen. Allen conceded that, while the jury instructions "generally" control, "their interpretation may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it." 442 U.S. at 158;
see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54 442 U.S. at 514-17. The Court quickly dismissed the prosecution's argument that the instruction contained a permissive inference, saying only that "[the jurors] were not told that they had a
choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were only told that the law presumed it. It is
clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory." Id. at 515.
The prosecution's alternative argument-that the instruction contained a production shifting presumption-was augmented by a holding of the Montana Supreme Court that the sole legal effect of
the presumption was to shift the burden of production. Notwithstanding, the Court explained:
If Montana intended its presumption to have only the effect described by its Supreme
Court, then we are convinced that a reasonable juror could well have been misled by the
instruction given, and could have believed that the presumption was not limited to requiring the defendant to satisfy only a burden of production.... They were not told that the
presumption could be rebutted ... by the defendant's simple production of "some" evidence; nor even that it could be rebutted at all.
Id. at 517.
55 Id.
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might have obviated the risk of an erroneous interpretation. 56 It also
noted that the lay definition of presume, "to suppose to be true without
proof," augmented the conclusion that the jurors might have interpreted
57
the presumption as conclusive or persuasion shifting.
B. Applicable Analysis
Having determined that a reasonable juror might have interpreted
the instruction as conclusive or persuasion shifting, the Court next tackled the question of whether those types of presumptions are constitutionally infirm. The Court began its analysis with a review of Winship.58
The Court found that Winship required the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Sandstrom "purposely or knowingly" caused his
victim's death. Thus, the Court reasoned that if the instruction had the
effect of relieving the prosecution of its Winship burden, the presumption
must fail constitutional scrutiny. 5 9 Under this rubric, if the instruction
had a conclusive effect, it fails under Morissette and Gypsum because it
"would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence...' and
would 'invade the factfinding function' which in a criminal case the law
assigns solely to the jury." 60 If, conversely, the instruction had a persuasion shifting effect, it fails under Mullaney and Patterson because it shifted
61
the burden of disproving intent to Sandstrom.
Justice Rehnquist concurred, but he expressed a desire to read Sandstrom restrictively. 6 2 Justice Rehnquist explained that, while he would defer to the Court's analysis in this case, he was "loathe to see this Court go
56 Id. By "qualifying" instructions, the Court meant "instructions as to the legal effect of the
presumption," not merely additional correct instructions. Id. The Court clarified this important
point in a footnote, explaining:
The potential for these interpretations of the presumption was not removed by the other
instructions given at the trial. It is true that the jury was instructed generally that the accused was presumed innocent until proved guilty, and that the State had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the deceased
purposely or knowingly. But this is not rhetorically inconsistent with a conclusive or burden shifting presumption. The jury could have interpreted the two sets of instructions as
indicating that the presumption was a means by which proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
to intent could be satisfied.
Id. at 518 n.7 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 517.
58 Id. at 519.
59 Id. at 521.
60 Id. at 523 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952) and United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978), respectively). See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
61 442 U.S. at 524. The prosecution offered two alternative rationales for affirmance of Sandstrom's conviction. First, it argued that since the instruction used the term "intends," the jurors
could have interpreted that word as referring only to the defendant's "purpose" instead of both his
"'purpose" and "knowledge." Thus, if the jury convicted Sandstrom only for his knowledge, it
would not have needed to rely on the impermissible presumption. Id. at 525. The Court remained
unconvinced, saying that "even ifajury could have ignored the presumption ... we cannot be certain
that this is what they [sic] did do." Id. at 526 (emphasis in original). Second, the prosecution argued
that the error was harmless because the evidence sufficiently supported the conviction. However,
the Court reserved judgment on the harmless error issue since it had not been considered in the
record below. See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of
harmless error to Sandstrom violations.
62 442 U.S. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger joined in the concurrence.
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into the business of parsing jury instructions given by state trial
courts." 63 He also questioned the ability of Sandstrom's jurors to "[divine] the difference recognized by lawyers between 'infer' and
'presume.' "64
IV.

A Decade of Confusion and Circumvention
The teaching of Sandstrom, although embodying a novel approach to
the analysis of presumptions, is quite straightforward. 65 Trial courts can
easily avoid the error by eliminating potentially persuasion shifting or
conclusive presumptions from jury instructions, and the analysis expected of reviewing courts is relatively uncomplicated. Nonetheless,
many circuit courts continued to affirm the constitutional validity of such
presumptions by distinguishing Sandstrom on a variety of rationales. 66
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Sandstrom in 1985 in Francisv. Franklin. 6 7 In Franklin, the Court addressed major areas of confusion which
had plagued the circuits in the aftermath of Sandstrom. Unfortunately,
many post-Franklin decisions continue to reflect uncertainty over the
analysis required under Sandstrom.6 s
A.

Initial Reactions to Sandstrom: 1979 - 1985
Although the circuits acknowledged Sandstrom's holding, many cases
reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of, or resistance to, Sandstrom's
methodology. Three approaches used in the circuit courts to determine
the validity of challenged presumptions illustrate the scope of the problem. First, most often circuit decisions have distinguished the presumptions before them from Sandstrom on the basis of contextual language or
rebuttability; some have also applied standards other than the "risk"
standard. 6 9 Second, some circuit decisions have demonstrated a willing63 Id. at 527. Justice Rehnquist referred to an earlier case, Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146-47 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that "a single instruction to a jury may not be
judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Justice Rehnquist did not disclose why he felt that the second step in the Sandstrom analysis (i.e., determining
whether contextual instructions eliminate the risk of misinterpretation) might be inadequate to meet
this concern. Some circuit courts have expressed similar reservations. See infra note 80.
64 442 U.S. at 528. Justice Rehnquist's doubts led him to abandon his support of Sandstrom six
years later. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
65 A Sandstrom analysis should entail three basic steps:
1. Determine, from the challenged language itself, whether a reasonable juror might have interpreted the presumption as persuasion shifting or conclusive.
2. If so, look to the contextual instructions; determine whether the context of the presumption
adequately explains the legal effect of the presumption.
3. If the contextual language does not "cure" the persuasion shifting or conclusive presumption, then the presumption is a Sandstrom error.
See Doyel, Burden-Shifting CriminalJury Instructions in Georgia, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1986) (suggesting a step-by-step analysis to determine the constitutionality of any presumption). But see Allen
& DeGrazia, The ConstitutionalRequirement of ProofBeyond Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment
Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1982) (claiming that Sandstrom 's
"misdirected theory" has caused "inconsistency... [and] a considerable waste of time and effort in
constructing highly technical analyses that are unresponsive to the real interests at stake").
66 See infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
67 471 U.S. 308 (1985). See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text, discussing Franklin.
68 See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
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NOTE

ness to restrict Sandstrom's effect to the specific presumption before the
have placed great
Sandstrom Court. 70 Third, some circuit decisions
71
weight on the defense theory raised at trial.
1. Context, Rebuttability and Standards
In Jacks v. Duckworth Jacks i),72 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the following instruction: "Bear[] in mind the presumption of law, that everyone is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his voluntary acts, unless the circumstances are such to
indicate the absence of such intent."'7 3 Contextual instructions informed
the jury that the prosecution carried the burden of proof on all elements
of the crime, and that the jury could look to all the circumstances surrounding the killing to find intent. 74 The Seventh Circuit found no error. It held that the correct contextual instructions, coupled with the
language, of 5rebuttal, "nulliflied] the mandatory flavor" of the
7
presumption.
Likewise, in Potts v. Zant, 76 the trial court had presented the jury with
three "presumptions of law" which it defined as "conclusion[s] which the
law draws from given facts:"' 77 (1) Every person is presumed to be of
sound mind and discretion; (2) The acts of a person of sound mind and
discretion are presumed to be the product of that person's will; and (3) A
person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural
and probable consequences of his act. 78 The trial court told the jury that
each presumption could be rebutted if "overcome by evidence to the
contrary."'7 9 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the overall effect of
the charge, delivered here was such that it is unlikely that a reasonable
juror would have given the presumption conclusive or burden shifting
70
71
72

See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
651 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982). The illustrations throughout

this section do not necessarily attempt to demonstrate that the circuits have reached incorrect conclusions, but rather that they have employed incorrect rationales to reach those conclusions.

73 Id. at 491. The instruction continued: "When an unlawful act, however, is proved to be
knowingly done, no further proof is needed on the part of the state in the absence ofjustifying or
excusing facts, since the law presumes a criminal intent from an unlawful act knowingly done." Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 485-86. The court explained:
[I]n contrast to the instruction condemned in Sandstronm ... [this instruction] does not contain a mandatory injunction to presume the requisite intent from the act committed since
the jurors were told they could "look to all the surrounding circumstances, including what
was rebuttable by
was said and done in relation thereto" and that any presumption ...

"justifying or excusing facts." The absence of a mandatory effect.., is also shown by the
qualifying phrase "unless the circumstances are such as to indicate the absence of [] intent"
which follows the reference to the presumption ....
Id. at 485.
The dissent criticized the majority for creating "a dangerous precedent that shatters the foundation of our criminal justice system: that every person is presumed innocent unless proven otherwise
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 491 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
76 734 F.2d 526 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Potts v. Kemp, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
77 Id. at 533. The Potts court also analyzed and approved a permissive presumption.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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effect." 8 0 The presence of the rebuttability clause and the fact that the
trial court had given otherwise flawless instructions convinced the court
that no Sandstrom error had occurred. 8 '
The bases for the Jacks and Potts decisions contradict Sandstrom.
First, Sandstrom explicitly rejected the theory that the mere presence of
other correct instructions cures an infirm presumption.8 2 Second, Sandstrom recognized that rebuttal language in itself may be burden shifting
rather than ameliorative.8 3 Finally, the Potts "likelihood" standard stands
at odds with Sandstrom, which simply requires the possibility of an errone84
ous interpretation by the jury.
80 Id. at 534 (emphasis added). In analyzing the Sandstrom claim, the Polls court stressed the
standard enunciated in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973), for federal review of state jury
instructions. The Cupp Court was concerned about federal interference with state court practices,
which, although admittedly undesirable, were not constitutional errors. Id. at 145-46. Thus, the
Cupp Court explained that "[b]efore a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state
trial .. .it must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even
'universally condemned,' but that it violated some right which is guaranteed to the defendant by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Accordingly, the Court directed that "the ailing instruction by itself
[must] so infect[] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Id. at 147.
Some circuit decisions adopt the view that Cupp demands an analysis beyond that demanded by
Sandstrom. See, e.g., Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1982), in which the First Circuit upheld
the validity of the instruction, "[a] person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own acts. For example, someone who strikes another with a hammer is presumed to
intend the injury to the person being struck." Id. at 292-93. The Ashe court indicated that it might
reverse if the instruction had been given in a federal district court instead of a state court. However,
the Ashe court believed that, under Cupp, it had no "supervisory power" over state court jury instructions. Id. at 290. In dissenting from a similar analysis by the Second Circuit in Langone v. Smith,
682 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983), Judge Oakes asserted that "the
application of Cupp v. A'aughten in this fashion simply reads Sandstrom out of the United States Reports." Id. at 290 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
Sandstrom should not implicate the concerns of Cupp. Cupp applies only to nonconstitutional
errors; by definition, Sandstrom error is of constitutional dimension. The fact that the Sandstrom analysis includes consideration of qualifying language, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, should
also address any lingering doubts about the Cupp standard. Additionally, Sandstrom itself involved a
state court jury instruction; had the Sandstrom Court intended that Cupp limit its holding, it surely
would have addressed that issue. But see supra note 63 and accompanying text, discussing Justice
Rehnquist's opinion on the relationship between Cupp and Sandstrom.
81 734 F.2d at 534. The court asserted that the rebuttability clause "clearly serves to distinguish
this case from Sandstrom." Id. Additionally, the court looked to the contextual instructions, which
stated, inter alia, that the defendant did not have to disprove intent, that the prosecution carried the
burden of proof on all elements of the crime, and that the jury should determine intent from all the
evidence. The court believed that these additional instructions "reduc[ed] the likelihood that the
jury might misunderstand the permissive character of these presumptions." Id. The fact that the
trial court had phrased the third presumption permissively earlier in the instruction served as another criterion for minimizing the effect of that presumption. Id. The court did not explain why it
thought that jurors faced with both permissive and mandatory language would resolve the inconsistency in favor of the permissive language.
82 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Judge Swygert, dissenting inJacks, noted this error:
"We cannot be sure that the text of the other instructions mitigated the effect of the improper language.... As Sandstrom points out, 'even if a jury could have ignored the presumption ...we cannot
be certain that this is what they [sic] did do.' " 651 F.2d at 493 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979)) (emphasis in original).
83 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Judge Swygert appealed to the Jacks majority on this
ground as well, arguing that "[the majority's holding] ignores the nature of the two-part analysis in
Sandstrom. . . . The Court held the instruction to violate the Due Process Clause under either [a
conclusive or persuasion-shifting] interpretation." 651 F.2d at 491 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
84 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Examples of deviations from Sandslrom similar to
those inJacks and Polls include United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no
error, in part because the trial court had explained the element of intent and the prosecution's burden to the jury), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); Hux v. Murphy, 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984)
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Restriction of Sandstrom to its Facts
In Pigee v. Israel,85 the Seventh Circuit found no error in the follow-

ing instruction: "When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut
the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all
the natural and probable and usual consequences of his deliberate
acts. '"86 The court distinguished Sandstrom on a variety of grounds, including the fact that the Pigee instruction used the term "deliberate acts"
as opposed to "voluntary acts"; 8 7 that the presumption applied only to a
"reasonable" person, not to "any" person; s8 and that the presumption
spoke of "natural, probable and usual" consequences, not "ordinary"
consequences. 8 9 However, the Pigee court encouraged trial courts to
(finding no error in light of whole charge, which told jury that the prosecution had the burden of
proof on all elements of the crime, and that intent was an element), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985),
overruled, Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1985); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 (1 lth Cir. 1983)
(finding that clear statement of state's burden of proof and language of rebuttability made presumption, at most, permissive), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1224 (1984); Mattes v. Gagnon, 700 F.2d 1096 (7th
Cir. 1983) (finding that numerous general instructions mitigated any erroneous effect); Brayboy v.
Scully, 695 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that, although challenged presumption was given three
times, it did not constitute error because two of the three times the words "unless the act was done
under circumstances or conditions precluding [presumption]" or "unless the contrary appears from
the evidence" followed and the third time the presumption was preceded by general contextual
instructions), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055 (1983); Rock v. Coombe, 694 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying a "likely effect" test instead of the "risk" standard), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); Rivera v.
Coombe, 683 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that any error in presumption itself was cured by
contextual instructions and rebuttability clause), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1162 (1983); United States v.
Wolters, 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding no error because the jury was told of the presumption
of innocence and the government's burden of proof).
A few cases have rejected the argument that correct contextual instructions or rebuttability
clauses prevent or cure Sandstrom errors. The Sixth Circuit has done so quite consistently. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Austin, 728 F.2d 1389 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (finding that correct contextual language tends
more to confuse than clarify); Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that instructions on state's burden of proof and the presumption of innocence merely contradicted presumption
but did not cure it), aff'd by an equally dividedcourt, 466 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v. Hogg, 670 F.2d
1358 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that overall import of instruction was to lower state's burden of proof
and that rebuttability clause is not curative); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981)
(rejecting idea that general contextual instructions obviate possibility of an erroneous application of
the presumption by the jury), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131
(8th Cir. 1981) (holding that fact that the presumption could be rebutted by "other evidence" was
not curative because "it is apparent that the 'other evidence' which might rebut ... would only be
offered by the defendant"); United States v. Davis, 608 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating in dictum
that clauses such as "unless there is evidence to the contrary" may be persuasion shifting), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). However, it is worthy of note that in many cases in which Sandstrom
error has been found, the courts have held the errors harmless. See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.
85 670 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982).
86 Id. at 692.
87 Id. at 694. According to the court, "[a] deliberate act is something more [than a voluntary
act); it involves actions which are carefully considered, as a result of some prior weighing of the acts
and their consequences." Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, the court reasoned, the jury would have to
determine, from all the evidence, that the defendant's acts were "deliberate" before the presumption would arise. Id. The dissent disagreed, arguing that "no definition of 'deliberate' was given to
the jury and no attempt was made by the trial judge to distinguish between voluntary acts and deliberate acts as is done in the majority opinion." Id. at 697 (Baker, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 694 ("Thus, the instruction in this case indicates that the presumption may be applied
only if the jury decides that the defendant was a reasonable person.") (footnote omitted).
89 Id. The court admitted that this distinction was of "minor significance." Id. The court also
held that the introductory language, "[w]hen there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut," was
the "crucial qualifying language which the Supreme Court found lacking in Sandstrom." Id. Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if the jury could have viewed the presumption as mandatory,
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avoid such instructions because of the flood of appeals spawned by
Sandstrom.90

3.

Significance of the Defense Theory
In finding the challenged presumption in Mancuso v. Harris91 constitutional, the Second Circuit considered the extent to which the element
of intent was at issue. 9 2 Mancuso had advanced a defense of noninvolvement and accordingly attempted to discredit witnesses to his involvement. Since Mancuso did not introduce evidence on state of mind, the
court concluded that, once the jury has rejected the noninvolvement defense, one challenged instruction on intent created no "significant possi93
bility" of harm.
Conversely, in Ramirez v. Jones, 94 the Second Circuit found a challenged presumption to be persuasion shifting, in part because the defendant had brought intent into issue. The defendant did this, the court
explained, by admitting to the conduct charged, but claiming that he
lacked the requisite state of mind to be convicted of the crime. 9 5 The
court concluded that, in contrast to Mancuso,9 6a significant possibility of
harm existed because of the defense theory.
"the presumption imposes at most an extremely low burden of production on the defendant." Id. at
695.
The dissent believed that "the majority decision is in collision with Sandstrom." Id. at 697
(Baker, J., dissenting). Judge Baker explained that the prefatory phrase "condemns the instruction
and makes possible the untenable interpretation that the defendant must disprove intent." Id.
90 Id. at 696 (The court suggested that "a sweeping application of the doctrine in Sandstrom
would provide greater reason to limit the doctrine to prospective application."). See also Lampkins v.
Gagnon, 710 F.2d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the same instruction used in Pigee) (fact that
presumption was given twice, and the second time without any correct contextual instructions,
"stands alone in this case as an indication of a risk ofjury confusion, and, as such, it is too slight a
peg to support a finding that the jury was unconstitutionally instructed"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1050
(1984); Nelson v. Scully, 672 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir.) ("To be sure, a trained lawyer possessing...
analytical skill ... could parse the instruction .... But this is attributing altogether too much legal
acumen to the ordinary juror-who had not imbibed Wigmore's Evidence with his mother's milk."),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
91 677 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 (1982). Thejury instruction stated: "Everyone is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act and unless the act is done under
circumstances or conditions that might preclude the existence of such intent, you, the jury, have to
find, have a right to find the requisite intent from the proven action of an individual." Id. at 207.
92 Id. at 211.
93 Id. (quoting Nelson v. Scully, 672 F.2d 266 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982)).
94 683 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983). The challenged instruction
stated:
A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts....
Under our law, every person is presumed to intend the natural and inevitable consequences
of his own acts .... [One's mind is compelled from necessity to refer to the acts and
physical manifestations of the intent exhibited by the results produced is the safest, if not
the only[,] proof of the fact to be ascertained.
Id. at 714-15.
95 Id. at 716.
96 Id. ("[T]he [.Vancuso] court found it significant that .. .the defendant had not specifically
placed the question of his intent in issue .... In this case, however, appellee admitted that he
stabbed Casilla. Thus the essential issue to be decided by the jury was whether appellee possessed
the intent necessary to support a conviction.").
The court refused to hold that, by asserting self defense, Ramirez conceded his intent to kill.
The court explained that "appellee's intent to defend himself is consistent with either (a) an intent to
kill, (b) an intent to injure seriously, or (c) an intent to injure slightly." Id. See also Mason v.
Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (finding Sandstrom error because, in asserting self
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Aside from the fact that the "significant possibility of harm" standard has no place in a Sandstrom inquiry, the emphasis placed on the theory of defense finds little support in Sandstrom.9 7 Of greater concern,
however, is the difficulty such an emphasis causes for a defendant who
either advances a nonparticipation defense or relies totally on the prose98
cution's burden of proof.
B.

Francis v. Franklin: The Supreme Court Reevaluates Sandstrom

The Supreme Court spoke again on the central issue of Sandstrom in
Francis v. Franklin.9 9 The Franklin Court analyzed the following jury instruction: "The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may
be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts but the presumption may be
rebutted."' 0 0 Following the analysis set forth in Sandstrom, the Court
found the instruction unconstitutional.10 1
defense, the defendant was forced to admit the facts that activated the presumption), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1016 (1983).
97 Although the Sandstrom Court found the presumption of, intent especially egregious in that
case because of the nature of Sandstrom's defense, 442 U.S. at 520-2 1, it did not indicate that the
Constitution approves such presumptions as to defendants who do not raise mens rea defenses. Indeed, Winship, the pivotal case upon which Sandstrom relies, held that the prosecution must prove
every element necessary to constitute the crime charged, not just those elements which the defendant actively contests. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Mullaney also supports this proposition. The prosecution in Mullaney argued that once the jury
had determined that the defendant was culpable to some extent, the defendant's interest in liberty
and reputation had diminished to the extent that shifting the burden of persuasion on state of mind
was an immaterial error. See supra note 28. This argument parallels the holding in Mancuso; the
Mancuso court held that once the jury rejected the noninvolvement defense-and therefore determined that the defendant was culpable to some extent-a persuasion shifting instruction on state of
mind was not error. See supra note 93. The Mullaney Court rejected this reasoning, saying "[t]he
safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination of guilt may
already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a significant
impairment of personal liberty." 421 U.S. at 698. To the extent that the Mancuso approach violates
this principle of Mullaney, it is invalid.
The courts have also placed weight on the nature of the defense in harmless error determinations. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
98 Judge James Oakes of the Second Circuit, who has consistently championed Sandstrom over
the past decade, asserts:
Whether intent is the only element at issue or only one of several to be decided by the jury
should not be the key for holding that a Sandstrom charge is constitutionally defective. In
either case, the burden of proving every element of the crime charged, including intent,
must remain with the prosecution. Where such a charge is employed and there exists the
possibility, however slight, that a reasonable juror could have concluded that the presumption was sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's burden as to intent, then Sandstrom instructs
that there has been constitutional error.
Oakes, The Status of Sandstrom in the Second Circuit, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 641, 652 (1983) (footnotes
omitted). See infra note 133, discussing the strategic difficulties that the emphasis on the defense
theory creates for defendants.
99 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
100 Id. at 309.
101 Id. at 325. As it had in Sandstrom, the Court first examined the presumption to determine
whether a reasonablejuror might interpret it in an unconstitutional manner, id. at 316-17, and then
analyzed the general contextual instructions to determine whether they adequately explained the
legal effect of the presumption. Id. at 318-20.
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1. Reaffirmation of the Sandstrom Mandate
Franklin reaffirmed Sandstrom in three important ways. First, the
Court once again held that correct contextual instructions do not cure an
infirm instruction unless they explain its legal effect. 10 2 Second, the
Court reiterated Sandstrom's holding that persuasion shifting presumptions are as constitutionally onerous as conclusive presumptions. 10 3 Finally, the Court expressly rejected any standard other than the "risk"
04
standard enunciated in Sandstrom.
Unlike Sandstrom, the Franklin decision attracted only a five person
majority. Justice Powell dissented because he believed that the correct
contextual instructions adequately eliminated the possibility of misinterpretation by the jury. 10 5 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor
and Chief Justice Burger, accused the majority of extending Sandstrom.
Rehnquist advanced an analysis comparable to that used in many of the
6
circuit cases discussed above. 10
102 Id. General contextual instructions told thejury that the defendant is presumed innocent and
that the prosecution must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentence immediately following the presumption told the jury that "[a] person will not be presumed to
act with criminal intention." Id. at 319.
The Franklin Court first rejected the prosecution's argument that the general instructions sufficiently clarified the presumption, noting that a reasonable juror might think that the presumption
provided the prosecution with the requisite proof. Id. The Court then found the "criminal intention" language unhelpful; it explained that "a reasonable juror trying to make sense of the juxtaposition [of the two instructions] may well have thought that the instructions related to different
elements of the crime and were therefore not contradictory." Id. at 320-21. The Court concluded
that "language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Id. at 322.
103 Id. at 316-18. "The language challenged here differs from Sandstrom, of course, in that the
jury in this case was explicitly informed that the presumptions 'may be rebutted'... . A mandatory
rebuttable presumption is perhaps less onerous from the defendant's perspective, but it is no less
unconstitutional." Id. at 316-17.
104 Id. at 322 n.8. The majority rejected an alternative "at least as likely as not" test proposed by
the dissent (see infra note 106 and accompanying text):
This proposed alternative standard provides no sound basis for appellate review of jury
instructions. Its malleability will certainly generate inconsistent appellate results and
thereby compound the confusion that has plagued this area of the law. Perhaps more importantly, the suggested approach provides no incentive for trial courts to weed out potentially infirm language from jury instructions; in every case, the "presumption of innocence"
boilerplate in the instructions will supply a basis from which to argue that the "tone" of the
charge as a whole is not unconstitutional. . . . Most importantly, the dissent's proposed
standard is irreconcilable with bedrock due process principles.... [W]hen there exists a
reasonable possibility that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of the law
in reaching a guilty verdict ... the verdict must be set aside.
Id.
105 Id. at 327-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). "We noted in Sandstrom that general instructions may be
insufficient by themselves to make clear that the burden of persuasion remains with the State. In this
case, however, the trial court went well beyond the typical generalities of such instructions." Id. at
329 (citation omitted).
106 Id. at 331-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist argued that (1) the correct contextual
language prevented jury misinterpretation, id. at 333-40; (2) the language of rebuttal distinguished
this instruction from the one given in Sandstrom, id.; and (3) the "risk" standard should be replaced
by an "at least as likely as not" standard for jury misinterpretation, id. at 342. Rehnquist also raised
the same concern mentioned in his concurring opinion in Sandstrom: "I do not believe that the Court
must inject itself this far into the state criminal process to protect the fundamental rights of criminal
defendants." Id. at 342. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Under this rubric, most of the circuit cases discussed above would be rightly decided. However,
adoption of Rehnquist's methodology requires complete abandonment of Sandstrom.
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Post Franklin Reactions in the Circuit Courts
Franklin's reaffirmation of Sandstrom did prompt some reform in the

circuits. 10 7 Nonetheless, many circuit decisions demonstrate misunder-

standing of or resistance to Franklin's true import. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently denied habeas corpus relief in Jacks v. Duckworth
(Jacks I).108 The petitioner in Jacks I1 unsuccessfully argued that Franklin "should serve to convince this Court that the majority in Vacks I] was
wrong with respect to whether the presumption complained of shifted
the burden of proof."' 1 9 Unpersuaded, the court reasoned that since
Franklin effected no change in the Sandstrom standard, the instruction
given atJacks' trial must still comport with that standard.1 10 In reaffirming its decision that the presumption did not violate Sandstrom, the Seventh Circuit applied the same incorrect standard it had used in Jacks Ithe standard explicitly rejected by Franklin. 1
107 For example, the post-Franklin Tenth Circuit held that general contextual instructions do not
cure or prevent Sandstrom error. See Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1985) (overruling Hux v.
Murphy, 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985)); accord Myrick v. Maschner,
799 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that Franklin disposes of the
argument that a rebuttability clause cures or prevents Sandstrom error. See Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1142 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit began to find Sandstrom
error without reservation; in fact, it reversed several prior Sandstrom decisions in which it had applied
an improper analyis. See, e.g., Lakes v. Ford, 779 F.2d 1578 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding error despite
presence of rebuttability clause and general instructions); Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1515 (11 th Cir.)
(finding Sandstrom error because no rhetorically inconsistent instructions accompanied the error),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985). Lastly, the Second Circuit applied the correct standard for contextual instructions in Fratarcangelo v. Smith, 792 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1986), in which it held that a challenged instruction, immediately followed by phrase beginning with "in other words," was not error
because the contextual instructions explained the legal effect of the presumption within the meaning
of Franklin.
108 857 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989). See supra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text, discussingJacks I.
109 Appellant's Brief at 23,Jacks 11 (No. 87-1327).
110 857 F.2d at 402-04. In addition to reaffirming the reasons for not finding error in Jacks I
(contextual instructions and rebuttability), the court added a third: Jacks had raised an insanity defense; the court reasoned that if the jury had believed "the slightest shred" of his evidence, it would
not have applied the presumption in the first instance because "none of his acts could be considered
'knowingly' or 'voluntary.' " Id.
111 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. The following cases illustrate similar postFranklin rationales:
In Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1142 (1986), the Seventh
Circuit reconsidered Pigeev. Israel in light of Franklin. After recounting the reasons advanced in Pigee
for denying relief, see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text, the Dean court concluded that Franklin disposed of only one: that the presumption could be overcome by circumstances which prevent or
rebut its operation. 777 F.2d at 1244. Not only did the court hold that the remaining reasons were
still valid, but it also added a new rationale: Since the instruction referred to "circumstances" but
failed to say which party carried the burden of making them appear, the jury would not have understood it as throwing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Id. The use of this rationale is
highly questionable in light of both Sandstrom's and Franklin's declarations that such ambiguities may
easily be confusing to the jury.
Likewise, in Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986), the
Ninth Circuit rejected a Sandstrom claim because "[a]lthough the initial instruction may have had the
potential to confuse the jury, the court's final instruction that the state has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt... was sufficient to clear up any initial confusion." Id. at 726 (footnote
omitted). The court did not attempt to reconcile this conclusion with Franklin or Sandstrom.
See also Mancuso v. Scully, 824 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting appeal, in which petitioner
asked the court to reconsider its prior decision (see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text) in light
of Franklin, because intent was not the thrust of the defense); Williford v. Young, 779 F.2d 405 (7th
Cir. 1985) (finding that instruction, reviewed in the light of Franklin, easily passed scrutiny because
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Extrinsic Causes of Sandstrom's Deterioration

Two related developments, although not bearing directly on the
Sandstrom analysis, have affected Sandstrom adversely. First, the circuits
have frequently applied the harmless error doctrine to the few cases in
which they do find Sandstrom violations. "1 2 Second, federal habeas
corpus restrictions on petitioners who have committed procedural default create an almost insurmountable barrier to relief in Sandstrom
cases. 113
A.

Harmless Error Rationales

4
The Supreme Court first addressed the harmless error doctrine's"
applicability to Sandstrom error in 1983 in Johnson v. Connecticut,' 15 but
deep divisions among the Justices prevented a resolution of that issue
until 1986 in Rose v. Clark." l 6 BothJohnson and Clark reflect an effort by
some Justices to limit Sandstrom indirectly through the generous application of the harmless error doctrine to Sandstrom violations. This effort
ultimately succeeded in Clark.

1.

Supreme Court Guidelines
The Court's attempt to resolve the harmless error issue in Johnson

resulted in a plurality decision. The plurality argued that, at least in the
case of a conclusive presumption," 7 a reviewing court could hold Sandstrom error harmless in two situations only: (1) where the erroneous instruction had no bearing on the offense for which the defendant was
convicted, and (2) where the defendant has conceded intent; the defendof the general contextual instructions), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778
F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no error because under state law the presumption shifted only the
burden of production, and considering possible jury misunderstanding irrelevant because the defendant advanced a nonparticipation defense).
112 See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
114 A harmless error analysis, in the context of Sandstrom error, implicates the sixth amendment
right to trial by a jury of one's peers. The Supreme Court first held that errors of constitutional
dimension might be subject to harmless error analysis in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Under Chapman, an error is harmless when the reviewing court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24. Errors subject to
harmless error analysis include admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
(Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)); improper comments on the defendant's failure to testify
(United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)); and refusal to permit cross examination concerning
witness bias (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). The Chapman rule "promotes public
respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial, rather than on the
virtual inevitable presence of immaterial error." Id. at 681. See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
Chapman explained, however, that some constitutional errors always mandate reversal because
they render a trial fundamentally unfair. 386 U.S. at 23. Such errors include admission into evidence of a coerced confession (Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)); complete denial of counsel
(Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); and adjudication by a biased judge (Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
115 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (plurality opinion).
116 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
117 460 U.S. at 83-85. The specific question before the Court was "whether a charge that might
reasonably have been interpreted to require a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent may be
considered harmless." Id. at 83-84. The Court did not directly address the harmless error analysis
appropriate for a persuasion shifting presumption.
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ant "may in some cases" do so by raising defenses such as alibi, insanity,
or self defense. 1 18 Because a reviewing court cannot say with certainty
that the jury considered the evidence of state of mind, the plurality
believed that such evidence should be irrelevant in a harmless error
analysis.1 1 9
The dissent criticized the plurality for advancing an "automatic reversal" rule for Sandstrom error. 120 The dissent reasoned that ajury need
not rely on the presumption when the basic facts "establish intent as conclusively as if it were unequivocally conceded." 1'2 A reviewing court
should therefore hold the error harmless if
it finds overwhelming evi12 2
dence of state of mind, the dissent opined.
The views expressed by theJohnson dissent influenced the majority
in Rose v. Clark. The Clark Court held that overwhelming evidence of
intent renders Sandstrom error harmless. 2 3 The Court explained that
Sandstrom sought to protect only the accuracy of the verdict, not the in118 Id. at 87. Guthrie v. Warden, 683 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1982), is an example of the first exception; the erroneous presumption in that case afflicted a different offense than that for which the
defendant was convicted. For examples of the second exception, see infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. The plurality cautioned that a defendant who relies entirely on the prosecutorial burden of proof should not be deemed to concede intent. 460 U.S. at 87 n.16.
119 The plurality asserted that a conclusive presumption has the same effect as a directed verdict;
thus, the jury faced with such a presumption would ignore the evidence and follow the presumption.
460 U.S. at 84-85. Since a conclusive presumption eases the jury's task, the plurality reasoned that
the jury would not deliberately undertake "'the more difficult task' of evaluating the evidence of
intent." Id. at 85. (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 526 n.13). In any event, the plurality contended,
reasonable jurors would do as they are told and ignore the evidence controverting the presumption.
Id. at 85 n.14.
The plurality believed that "[t]o allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's function of evaluating the evidence of intent, when the jury may never have performed that function, would give too
much weight to society's interest in punishing the guilty and too little weight to the method by which
decisions of guilt are to be made." Id. at 86.
120 Id. at 90 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the second exception outlined by
the plurality was largely meaningless, since a trial court would not give state of mind instructions if
the defendant had conceded intent. Id. at 94. Notwithstanding this argument, Sandstrom error often
occurs in cases in which the defendant has alleged self defense, alibi, or insanity. See infra notes 13233 and accompanying text.
The dissent disagreed with the characterization of a conclusive presumption as the functional
equivalent of a directed verdict; since the jury must find the basic facts before it may apply the
presumption, the dissent opined that "the presumption does not remove the issue of intent from the
jury's consideration." 460 U.S. at 95. This assertion reflects the dissent's apparent confusion over
the nature of a conclusive presumption. The dissent argued that " [s]uch a presumption leaves the
issue ultimately to the jury." Id. The dissent also repeatedly asserted that the presumption at issue
"permits" or "allows" a finding of intent from the basic facts, and that intent was still a question of
fact for the jury to determine. Id. at 95-98 & nn.3-5. The instruction at issue stated that "every
person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act." Id. at
96. By its very terms, the presumption controverts the dissent's assertion that it left the question of
intent to the jury.
121 Id. at 97-99.
122 The dissent suggested that Sandstrom error should be harmless whenever the evidence is so
dispositive of intent that a reviewing court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would
have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption. Id. at 97 n.5.
123 478 U.S. at 580 ("IT]he error at issue.., is not 'so basic to a fair trial' that it can never be
harmless.") (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). The Court adopted the test
approved by the dissent in Johnson; that is, that a Sandstrom error is harmless when a reviewing court
finds that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The Clark Court admitted that if the trial court had directed a verdict for the prosecution, harmless error could not be applied, even in the light of overwhelming evidence, because of the "Sixth
Amendment's clear command to afford jury trials in serious criminal cases." 478 U.S. at 578. How-

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:367

tegrity of the factfinding process. 124 Accordingly, the Court asserted that
a presumption existed in favor of applying harmless error analysis in
Sandstrom cases. t 25 The dissent protested that "It]he Constitution does
not allow an appellate court to arrogate to itself a function that the defendant, under the Sixth Amendment, can demand be performed by a
'1 2 6

jury.'

2.

Clark's Impact in the Circuits

Most circuits had previously adopted an analysis similar to that required by Clark.12 7 Consequently, the holding in Clark did not greatly
influence the circuits. Only in the Eighth Circuit, which had held that
Sandstrom error could not be harmless, and in the Sixth and Ninth Cirever, the Court specifically rejected the contention that Sandstrom error equals a directed verdict for
the state. Id.
The Court's attempt to distinguish mens rea presumptions from directed verdicts is unpersuasive. By definition, a conclusive presumption precludes the factfinder from considering the evidence
of the presumed fact. Likewise, a persuasion shifting presumption precludes the factfinder from
considering the evidence of the presumed fact unless a rebuttal occurs. See supra note 2. See also
Allen & DeGrazia, supra note 65, at 13 n.77 ("There is no functional difference between 'directing a
verdict' on an issue in every case and eliminating that element from the definition of the crime.")
(suggesting that conclusive presumptions essentially eliminate the presumed fact from the definition
of the crime);J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at 308 (asserting that a conclusive presumption renders the
existence of the presumed fact "wholly immaterial").
124 478 U.S. at 580.
125 The Court reviewed the history of harmless error analysis under Chapman and concluded that
"if the defendant had counsel and was tried before an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis." Id. at
579. It also asserted that the purpose behind Winship and Sandstrom "is to ensure that only the guilty
are criminally puinished." Id. at 580.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, took exception to the majority's characterization of
the harmless error rule. He argued that "our Constitution, and our criminal justice system, protects
other values besides the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination. A coherent harmless
error jurisprudence should similarly respect those values." Id. at 588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
However, Stevens agreed that the "primary" value protected by Sandstrom is an accurate determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 589.
126 Id. at 593 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that, when "[flaced with an incorrect instruction and a general verdict of guilty, a reviewing court simply lacks any adequate basis for
deciding whether the jury has performed its constitutionally required function." Id. at 596. The
dissent asserted that Sandstrom error is "analytically indistinguishable" from errors, such as ineffective counsel or a biased judge, which may never be harmless. Id. at 592-93.
Additionally, to the extent that the Clark majority's "overwhelming evidence" standard undermines the "risk" standard, it stands in direct conflict with Sandstrom and Franklin.
127 With little variation, the circuits have held Sandstrom error harmless if (1) the defendant failed
to raise a mens rea defense, and (2) overwhelming evidence in favor of conviction exists in the record.
Even though Clark adopted the overwhelming evidence test, many circuits still apply the mens rea
defense test as a corollary. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
A few pre-Clark cases refused to hold Sandstrom error harmless, regardless of the defense theory
or the evidence submitted. See, e.g., United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.) (holding that "[i]f
the Sixth Amendment right to ajury decision of guilt or innocence means anything, it means that the
facts essential to conviction must be proven beyond the jury's reasonable doubt, not ours"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986); Burton v. Burgman, 649 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that every
element is necessarily at issue in a criminal case, so fact that the defendant did not raise intent is
irrelevant), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 953 (1982); Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th
Cir. 1979) (refusing to consider the sufficiency of the evidence where mandatory presumption is
involved).
The pre-Clark Sixth and Ninth Circuits held that Sandstrom error could not be harmless if the
defendant raised a mens rea defense, even in the face of overwhelming evidence. See, e.g., Conway v.
Anderson, 698 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983) and Petition of Hamilton, 721
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cuits, which had held that Sandstrom error could not be harmless 128
if the
defendant raised a mens rea defense, did any major changes occur.
However, the way in which the circuit decisions, both before and
after Clark, have applied the "overwhelming evidence" test is disturbing.
For example, some circuits have found overwhelming evidence by simply
reapplying the erroneous presumption. 129 Others have found overwhelming evidence after weighing the credibility of the testimony and
evidence, thereby invading the exclusive province of the jury to decide
30
credibility issues.'
F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled after Clark by McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied sub nom. McKenzie v. McCormick, 109 S. Ct. 250 (1988).
Of course, no post-Clark cases advance these views. See infra note 128 and accompanying text,
discussing Clark's effect on these cases.
Some cases evidence an analytical confusion between the substantive claim and the harmless
error analysis, and thus also do not fall within the general pattern described above. For example, in
Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983), the Fourth Circuit considered three factors in its harmless error analysis: (1) whether the presumption was permissive or mandatory; (2) whether curative instructions were also given; and (3) whether overwhelming
evidence of intent could be found in the record. Clearly, the first and second questions should be
answered in the initial Sandstrom inquiry, not in the harmless error analysis. Accord United States v.
Cerone, 830 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1730 (1988).
128 See United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1987) (court finds error harmless after
Clark despite previous holdings that Sandstrom error could never be harmless), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1730 (1988); Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1986) (circuit rule that a mens rea defense
precludes finding of harmless error does not survive Clark); Merlo v. Bolden, 801 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1986) (after Clark, presence of mens rea defense does not prevent finding of harmless error), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1358 (1987).
129 See, e.g., Payne v. Le Fevre, 825 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.) (court finds that the basic facts conclusively
establish the ultimate fact of intent), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 508 (1987); Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d 834
(6th Cir. 1984) (court looks to the physical facts of the murder itself to find overwhelming evidence
of intent and malice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); Fulton v. Warden, 744 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.
1984) (finding that physical evidence established guilt, even though three alibi witnesses testified for
defendant), cert. deniedsub nom. Fulton v. Collins, 473 U.S. 907 (1985); Conway v. Anderson, 698 F.2d
282 (6th Cir.) (court finds overwhelming proof of intent from the "vicious nature" of crime), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983); McGuinn v. Crist, 657 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981) (court finds that no
reasonable juror could doubt intent because of the nature of the killing (four bullet wounds close
range)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1982)
(court finds that the basic facts establish state of mind conclusively), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011
(1983).
A jury may infer mens rea from conduct alone; indeed, proof of conduct may be the only indication ofmens rea available in a given case. But a critical difference exists between allowing ajury to find
state of mind from conduct alone and allowing a reviewing court to determine that a properly instructed jury would have reached that conclusion based on proof of conduct alone. As the dissent in
Clark noted, a reviewing court is simply incapable of determining what a jury might find from conduct alone in any given case. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The jury decision in Clark
presents a good example of this problem. Clark was charged with the first degree murder of two
people. The prosecution used the same evidence to prove both murders. Despite the fact that exactly the same sequence of events led to the two murders, the jury convicted Clark of first degree
murder for one killing and second degree murder for the other. See Clark, 478 U.S. at 494 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Eleventh Circuit's approach is more justifiable. It has held that a reviewing court should
not find overwhelming evidence exclusively from the sequence of physical acts involved in the crime,
but from evidence of state of mind as well, at least when intent is specifically at issue. The Eleventh
Circuit recommends this approach because conduct is often ambiguous. See Dix v. Kemp, 832 F.2d
546 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988).
130 See, e.g., Baker v. Montgomery, 811 F.2d 557 (11 th Cir. 1987) (court finds the defense theories
of provocation and self defense to be "frivolous and wholly implausible," noting that the defendant
was the only witness for the defense and that all other evidence at trial controverted his testimony);
Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (court finds overwhelming evidence based on
eyewitness testimony); Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (court finds overwhelming
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The circuits also often consider the defense theory significant; they
reason that the defendant who fails to raise a mens rea defense at trial
either "concedes" mens rea or "allows" the evidence to be overwhelming
by leaving it undisputed.' 3 ' This approach may permit Sandstrom error
to occur with impunity in trials in which the defendant raises self defense
or insanity, 13 2 claims alibi or nonparticipation, 13 3 and possibly even when
evidence because the defendant introduced no credible evidence on state of mind); Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1982) (court finds overwhelming evidence based on eyewitness testimony)
(dissent argues that "it is elementary that the jury, as weigher of credibility, may accept the testimony
of one witness and reject the evidence of a dozen others"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983). But see
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (court finds that defendant's one statement suggesting an accident defense is sufficient to prevent evidence from being overwhelming), vacated, 478
U.S. 1016 (1986).
131 See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
132 The effect of a self defense or insanity plea varies among the jurisdictions:
In the Ninth Circuit, a defendant who asserts an insanity or self defense theory at trial constructively concedes his state of mind. See, e.g., Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1986)
(insanity); Petition of Hamilton, 721 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by McKenzie
v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (self defense), cert. denied sub noma.McKenzie v. McCormick 109 S. Ct. 250
(1988).
In the Sixth Circuit, an insanity defense is equivalent to a concession of intent. See Cook v.
Foltz, 814 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir.) (an insanity plea does not controvert intent, but merely contests the
defendant's general ability to know right from wrong), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 119 (1987).
The Fifth and Second Circuits have held that by asserting self defense, the defendant makes
intent a critical issue. See Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (self defense plea
does not necessarily mean an intent to kill; rather, it means that the defendant is admitting involvement; one could shoot to frighten, wound, or reactively, with no specific intent, as well as to kill), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983); Arroyo v. Jones, 685 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.) (the defendant "highlighted"
intent by pleading self defense and amnesia), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).
Two panels of the Eleventh Circuit split that court on the issue of insanity; an en banc decision
later held that a plea of insanity does not elual a concession of intent. See Dix v. Kemp, 832 F.2d
546 (11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (insanity plea brings intent into issue) (arguing that the jury's rejection of an insanity defense does not mean that it found the defendant totally free of mental infirmity
or found that he had the capacity to form a specific intent), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 1247 (1988). See
generally W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, supra note 1, at § 4.1 (discussing the different theories of insanity
and what effect each has on mens rea).
The defenses of intoxication and accident are generally deemed to be mens rea defenses. See,
e.g., Lakes v. Ford, 779 F.2d 1518 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (accident); Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1537 (4th
Cir. 1987) (intoxication); Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983) (drugs), aff'd by an equally
dividedcourt, 466 U.S. 1 (1984). But see Church v. Kincheloe, 767 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1985) (intent not
at issue because the defendant conceded that he mentally intended to do physical acts; intoxication
only produced mistaken belief that what he was doing was lawful), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
133 See, e.g., Burton v. Foltz, 810 F.2d 118 (6th Cir.) (intent is conceded when sole issue raised by
defendant is nonparticipation), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 327 (1987); Payne v. Le Fevre, 825 F.2d 702
(2d Cir.) (nonparticipation defense concedes state of mind), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 508 (1987); Shaw
v. Johnson, 786 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.) (nonparticipation/alibi defense raised, so intent not at issue),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 843 (1986); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986) (nonparticipation
defense concedes intent), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.
1984) (intent and malice are not at issue where sole question at trial is the identity of the perpetrator), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); Garland v. Maggio, 717 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983) (effect of
Sandstrom error depends on the nature of the defense; nonparticipation defense may diminish effect
of error); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1982) (failure to object to instruction
coupled with exclusive reliance on nonparticipation defense may diminish effect of error), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir.) (nonparticipation defense
takes intent out of issue, so the error could not have contributed to the verdict), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1981); McGuinn v. Crist, 657 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981) (nonparticipation defense concedes
intent), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
In most of these cases, the lack of a mens rea defense was treated conjunctively with the presence
of overwhelming evidence. Most courts first look at the nature of the defense and then determine if,
in the light of that defense, overwhelming evidence exists. The interaction of these two criteria can
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the defendant relies entirely on the prosecution's burden of proof. 34
Moreover, Clark focuses exclusively on Sandstrom's concern with the
accuracy of the verdict. Clark overlooks the fact that the Sandstrom Court
predicated its holding on dual constitutional objections: that mens rea
presumptions conflict with the presumption of innocence and that they
interfere with the jury's factfinding process. 1 3 5 By creating a presumption in favor of applying harmless error analysis in Sandstrom cases, the
Clark Court also diminished the incentive to obey Sandstrom by removing
the penalty for noncompliance in most cases.
B.

Habeas Corpus Appeals

A habeas corpus petitioner who seeks federal collateral review of a
final judgment faces an obstacle potentially lethal to his Sandstrom claim.
If the petitioner failed to object to the alleged error at trial or on direct
appeal,13 6 the federal courts will refuse to address the merits of the Sandstrom claim unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for and actual prejudice from the procedural default.' 3 7 The courts have demanded very
create strategic difficulties for the defendant. For example, compare the approaches of the following
cases:
In Conway v. Anderson, 698 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983), the Sixth
Circuit explained that the defense of nonparticipation may diminish the effect of a Sandstrom error if
the proof of intent is overwhelming. Under the facts of that case, the court found that once the jury
had identified the defendant as the perpetrator (thereby disbelieving his noninvolvement defense), it
could not have reasonably found that he lacked the requisite intent because proof of intent was
overwhelming. In dictum, the court opined that if the defendant had raised no defense and simply
put the prosecution to its proof, the error would be harmful even if the proof of intent was overwhelming. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit held in McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), that since the defendant chose to raise a noninvolvement
defense instead of relying on the presumption of innocence, he effectively conceded intent, and
since the evidence was overwhelming, the error was harmless.
In Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the defendant did
rely entirely on the prosecutions's burden of proof. Thus, the court held that intent was "at issue."
However, the court found it significant that the defendant chose not to raise intent expressly, because this left strong evidence uncountered. Thus, the error was harmless. Five months later, the
Eleventh Circuit issued a "clarification" of Burger. The court explained that Burger should not be
interpreted as requiring a defendant to place intent explicitly in issue before he can prevail. Rather,
the court claimed that Burger merely noted that the evidence of intent is more likely to be overwhelming where the defendant has not attempted to counter the state's evidence. Burger v. Kemp,
796 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
134 See Burger, 785 F.2d 890, discussed supra note 133.
135 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
136 Most defendants who failed to object to the Sandstrom-type instruction at trial or on direct
appeal had trials prior to the Sandstrom decision. Before Sandstrom, defense counsel may have either
not realized that burden-shifting and conclusive presumptions violated the Constitution or they may
have thought it futile to object to instructions which had enjoyed such longstanding judicial use. See
generally Remington, State PrisonerAccess to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts;An
Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHmIO ST. LJ. 287, 288-89 (1983).
137 The Supreme Court first adopted the "cause and prejudice" standard for habeas corpus appeals from state court convictions in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The Sykes Court
believed that state contemporaneous objection rules protect the important state interests of finality
and comity, and thus should be accorded great deference by the federal judiciary. Thus, the Court
held that, absent a waiver of default by the state courts, a defendant may not allege federal constitutional violations for the first time on federal habeas corpus appeal without first showing cause for his
failure to object at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. Id. at 9091. The Court believed that this standard adequately protects "a defendant who in the absence of [a
federal habeas court] adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage ofjustice." Id. at 91. See also
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (holding that the burden ofjustifying federal habeas
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exacting proof of these elements. In fact, the difficulty of meeting the
cause and prejudice standard led one commentator to observe that
"although the symbolic significance of ... Sandstrom v. Montana remains
great, the practical impact ... is an unwarranted rise in state prisoner
expectations." 1 3 8
1. Cause
Federal habeas corpus petitioners generally advance two theories of
causation for their procedural defaults: (1) novelty of the Sandstrom claim
and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the federal courts accept the theoretical possibility that a petitioner could show cause through
proof of novelty or ineffective counsel, they routinely reject such claims
in individual cases.
The Supreme Court established a bright line test for determining
the novelty of a claim involving unconstitutional jury instructions in Engle
v. Issac 13 9 and Reed v. Ross. 14 0 Under Issac and Ross, such a novelty claim
does not constitute "cause" unless the petitioner's trial occurred before
Winship. The Engle Court reasoned that defense counsel had the "tools"
to construct Sandstrom-type claims after Winship. 14 1 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the habeas petitioner's novelty argument in McBee
v. Grant, 14 2 even though the petitioner's trial had occurred less than one
year after Winship and nine years before Sandstrom. 143 The Fifth Circuit
also rejected the novelty argument in Johnson v. Blackburn 144 because
Sandstrom "was45an entirely foreseeable extension" of Winship, Mullaney,
and Patterson.1
relief for state prisoners is "greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct
appeal").
In the subsequent decision of Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), the Supreme Court held that
the cause and prejudice prerequisites must be met even when the constitutional error affects "the
truth finding function of the trial." Id. at 129. The cause and prejudice standard also applies to
collateral review of federal decisions under United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
138 Remington, supra note 136, at 288-89.
139 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (holding that petitioner had failed to establish cause for not objecting to
a Mullaney-type state rule, since Winship was decided five years before and many defendants had
raised constitutional challenges based on Winship during those five years).
140 468 U.S. 107 (1984) (holding that petitioner established cause for failure to object to burdenshifting jury instruction at his 1969 trial because the law at that time provided no "reasonable basis"
for challenging the instruction; distinguishing Issac on the ground that it involved a post-lVinship
trial).
141 456 U.S. at 133.
142 763 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1985).
143 Id. at 817 ("[S]ince McBee was tried in January of 1971, after Winship, his claim was not so
novel as to constitute cause for his failure to object.").
144 778 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985).
145 Id. at 1047. TheJohnson court also relied on pre-Sandstrom federal and state cases which disapproved conclusive and burden-shifting presumptions prior to Sandstrom, as well as commentators
who foresaw the demise of presumptions after Jlullaney. Id. at 1047-48.
Other circuit cases reflect the Ross-Issac approach as well. See, e.g., Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d
569 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that petitioner failed to establish cause because Ilinship and other state
and federal cases indicating disapproval of the instruction preceded petitioner's trial), cert. denied,
482 U.S 916 (1987); Dudley v. Dalsheim, 686 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that petitioner had
the tools under state and federal law after ll'inship to construct the claim); Dietz v. Solem, 677 F.2d
672 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the fact that defense counsel was unaware of Mullaney, decided five
months prior to petitioner's trial, did not establish cause for failure to object to Sandstrom error);
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In response to thejudiciary's treatment of the novelty argument, petitioners have advanced the ineffective assistance of counsel theory; that
is, they argue that if pre-Sandstrom counsel had or should have had the
"tools" and foresight to construct a challenge to presumptive mens rea
instructions, but failed to do so, those attorneys provided ineffective
assistance. The Supreme Court impliedly rejected this argument in Issac,
explaining that "[not] every astute counsel would have relied upon Winship.... [T]he Constitution... does not insure that defense counsel will
recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim."' 14 6 Thus, in
Johnson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that failure to object to the "entirely
foreseeable" Sandstrom error did not render counsel ineffective because
that a timely objection would have alno reasonable probability existed
14 7
tered the outcome of the trial.
The Ross-Issac approach to causation penalizes habeas corpus petitioners for having mediocre legal counsel-not poor enough to be ineffective but not good enough to construct a foreseeable claim. Furthermore, the judiciary's expectation that defense attorneys could and
would construct Sandstrom-type objections without the benefit of Sandstrom seems ironic in light of the fact that many courts continue to be
unable or unwilling to recognize Sandstrom error.
2.

Prejudice
The Supreme Court explored the contours of the prejudice test in
United States v. Frady.148 The Court concluded that a habeas petitioner
"must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his
trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual
and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension."' 14 9 The circuits have followed this mandate by
Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.) (finding no cause because the instruction at issue had been
contrary to state law for more than a century), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981).
146 456 U.S. at 133-34 ("Where the basis of a constitutional claim is available, and other counsel
have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against labelling
alleged unawareness of the objection as cause for a procedural default.").
147 778 F.2d at 1050. In reaching this conclusion, the Johnson court relied on the facts that petitioner had not contested intent at his trial (he asserted a defense of nonparticipation), that contextually correct instructions surrounded the error, and that the evidence supporting the verdict was
overwhelming. Id. See also Lockett v. Ara, 740 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting petitioner's contention that the instructions were so constitutionally infirm that failure to object demonstrated ineffective counsel and thus constituted cause), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986); Tsirizotakis v. Le
Fevre, 736 F.2d 57, 62-63 (2d Cir.) (finding no ineffective assistance "of constitutional dimension"
because intent was not at issue (the defendant pleaded self defense); the court reasoned that counsel's failure to object "could well have reflected counsel's view that making an issue of intent would
only detract from petitioner's primary defense ofjustification"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869 (1984). But
cf. Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980) (The court explained that a lack of knowledge by
counsel that the actions of the judge constituted a due process violation is sufficient cause for failure
to object and that a defendant should not be bound by the non-tactical decisions of counsel if these
decisions result in prejudice. Upon rehearing, however, the court refused to find cause because
Tyler's counsel could not remember why he failed to object to the instruction.), vacated, 643 F.2d
1095 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
148 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
149 Id. at 170. The petitioner in Frady failed this test; the Supreme Court concluded that "the
strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled with Frady's utter failure to come
forward with a colorable claim that he acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he suffered such actual prejudice." Id.
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performing an analysis similar to a harmless error review. For example,
the Sixth Circuit found no prejudice in Fornash v. Marshall150 because (1)
the prosecution introduced overwhelming evidence of intent and (2)
other instructions cured "any possible defect" in the challenged presumption.' 5 1 Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the prejudice argument in Dudley v. Dalsheim 152 because it found strong and uncontradicted
153
evidence of intent in the record.
Application of the actual prejudice test to Sandstrom claims in this
manner indicates a lack of understanding of Sandstrom. Sandstrom stands
for the proposition that the possibility that the jury applied an impermissible presumption in itself constitutes prejudice to the defendant. Requiring a habeas corpus petitioner to show, as a procedural matter, facts far
in excess of those sufficient to support the underlying substantive claim
renders that underlying claim meaningless. 15 4
VI. Conclusion
The Sandstrom Court attempted to accord criminal defendants the
full benefit of their due process and jury trial rights. Trial courts can
easily avoid the harm which the Court sought to redress, and the analysis
expected of the reviewing courts is straightforward and practical. Sandstrom does not undermine the jury's right to infer state of mind from a
defendant's actions, if it so finds from all the evidence. Nor does it prevent the trial court from so instructing the jury. Yet, Sandstrom has encountered overwhelming resistance in the circuit courts.
Although the courts have not clearly expressed their reasons for resisting Sandstrom, at least three plausible theories of resistance exist.
First, the courts may hesitate to abolish the presumption because of the
150 686 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982).
151 Id. at 1187.
152 686 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1982).
153 Id. at 112. See also Bond v. Procunier, 780 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that petitioner
did not show actual prejudice because he did not contradict the evidence of intent, malice, and
premeditation; the "evidence" of mens rea referred to by the court consists of one eyewitness' testimony and the brutal nature of the killing). See supra notes 129-30 (similar treatment of harmless
error issue discussed). But cf. Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
643 F.2d 1095 (finding prejudice because the primary issue at trial was intent, the prosecution
stressed the presumption in opening and closing statements, and the challenged instruction was
clearly erroneous under Sandstrom), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
154 Professor Remington explains one reason why tension exists between Sandstrom and the restrictions on federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions:
The difficulty is created by the Supreme Court's desire to reaffirm important principles of
federal constitutional law, such as the requirement that guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and to make those decisions apply retroactively when they affect the integrity of the
factfinding process, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the increasing desire of the
federal courts to play only a limited role in the postconviction review of state prisoner convictions. These somewhat inconsistent objectives can be fully achieved only if state courts
willingly assume the responsibility for implementing decisions such as Sandstrom by reversing the large number of convictions that must be reversed if the decisions are to be applied
retroactively.
Remington, supra note 136, at 303. Remington suggests that "[ilf state courts refuse [to follow
Sandstrom], the responsibility for applying constitutional principles should be shared by the federal
courts through habeas corpus review." Id. at 305.
As with harmless error, the cause and prejudice standard stands in direct conflict with Sandstrom
and Franklin to the extent that it undermines the "risk" standard.
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practical difficulties inherent in proving state of mind. 15 5 Second, the
courts may fear that strict enforcement of Sandstrom would provoke a
flood of litigation. 156 Third, the courts may believe that Sandstrom vio57
lates the tradition of federal deference to state jury instructions.1
None of these reasons survives close scrutiny. First, the fact that the
mens rea presumption has enormous utility does not detract from its unconstitutionality. For as long as the criminal law requires the prosecution to show a guilty mind as well as an evil hand,15 8 the judiciary must
reject the mens rea presumption.
Second, strict enforcement of Sandstrom in present claims would arguably reduce or eliminate future claims. Such enforcement would force
the trial courts to carefully scrutinize jury instructions, thus minimizing
the possibility of error. Even if strict enforcement does result in increased litigation, however, the courts should not foreclose valid constitutional claims to solve docket problems.
Third, the principle that the federal courts should abstain from scrutinizing state jury instructions does not apply when an error of constitutional dimension has occurred. 159 Since Sandstrom error invokes both
sixth and fourteenth amendment concerns, the federal courts can and
should employ Sandstrom to sanction offending instructions.
Most. importantly, the lower courts must follow Supreme Court
precedents, even if those courts dislike the precedents or believe that
they are misguided. 60 Sandstrom and Franklin remain in the United
States Reports. Judicial integrity demands that courts adhere to them.
The circuits have not acted alone, however. The Supreme Court has
retreated from Sandstrom as well through extrinsic restrictions. The
Court's treatment of Sandstrom in the context of habeas corpus review
and harmless error analysis have, as a practical matter, reduced Sandstrom
to a polite fiction. If Sandstrom lacks constitutional merit, the Court
should overrule or restructure it. But if the result of Sandstrom is constitutionally required under the Winship and Morissette precedents, the
Court should construe it liberally to advance its objectives.
Laurie A. Briggs
155 See supra note 8 and accompanying text for the traditional statement of this view.
156 See, e.g., Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.) (expressing concern over the "plethora of
cases" raising Sandstrom claims), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982).
157 See supra note 80 (discussing the precedential basis for federal deference to state jury instructions, and the effect this deference may have on Sandstrom claims). Justice Rehnquist expressed this
reservation in his concurrence in Sandstrom. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 1.
159 See supra note 80.
160 Judge Oakes reminded the Second Circuit of this important point after reviewing that circuit's
treatment of Sandstrom:
It seems obvious that we will be confronted with Sandstrom issues for some time to come. If
consistency on this issue is to be restored, the Second Circuit must follow the teaching of
Sandstrom, rather than trying to avoid it through meaningless distinctions that only tend to
cloud an otherwise clear holding by the Supreme Court. In stating this, I am reminded of
that Court's mandate to the federal judiciary... that "a precedent of [the Supreme] Court
must be followed by the lower courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts
may think it to be."
Oakes, supra note 98, at 654-55 (footnote omitted).

